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ABSTRACT
The longstanding line of research that the analytic tradition calls metaphysics of time remains quite ignored by the 
theory of history.  To bring them closer, this study proposes to introduce to historians and theorists of history the 
metaphysics of time theses about the presentism/eternalism and the linear/closed time. For such purpose, we drew 
correspondences between the theory of history and the analytical metaphysics of time concerning some characteristics 
of the emerging concepts of historical time. These characteristics are related to the recent debate about presentism 
regarding the regimes of the historical time (multiple temporalities, presence, and pluritemporality); plural time in 
the analytical metaphysics and synchronous/asynchronous historical time; linear/closed time in the analytic tradition 
and being affected by historical time. As a result, this article presents how the analytical metaphysics of time theses 
disclose unnoticed contours related to the history theorists’ understanding about the relation with the past.
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RESUMO
A duradoura linha de pesquisa que a tradição analítica chama de metafísica do tempo é bastante desconhecida para 
os teóricos da história, apesar da prolífica nova metafísica do tempo histórico. Consequentemente, apresentamos 
aos historiadores e teóricos da história as teses da metafísica analítica do tempo acerca do presentismo/eternalismo 
e do tempo linear/fechado. Então, traçamos correspondências entre a teoria da história e a metafísica analítica 
do tempo quanto a conceitos emergentes de tempo histórico. Essas correspondências convergem para a recente 
discussão acerca do presentismo quanto aos regimes de tempo histórico (temporalidades múltiplas, presença e 
pluritemporalidade); o tempo plural na metafísica analítica e o tempo histórico síncrono/assíncrono; tempo linear/
fechado na tradição analítica e ser afetado pelo tempo histórico. Como resultado, o presente artigo mostra que as 
teses da metafísica analítica do tempo descritas revelam alguns contornos pouco notados da compreensão que 
teóricos da história mantêm acerca da relação com o passado.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE
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Historians tend to view natural time as the plain, flat, and boring succession of 
clock time. Nevertheless, it keeps complex textures and secrets similarly to historical 
time. This article approaches philosophical studies about natural time that can help the 
theorists of history to think over some issues related to the current debate around the 
concept of historical time. We will approximate the metaphysics of natural time in the 
analytical philsophy and of the metaphysics of historical time in the recent theory of 
history owing to a coincidence that invites us to bring them conceptually close, since 
both focus on the so-called presentism.
Concepts of historical time in the current theory of history and 
the regimes of the plural characteristic of historical time: multiple 
temporalities and polytemporality
The concepts of historical time underwent a renewal from the 2000s on, so that 
a “new metaphysics of time” arose. Theorists of history call new metaphysics of time 
the recent reconceptualization of historical time; however, they do not imply any 
relationship between this and the analytical metaphysics of time, with which they 
show little acquaintance, if any at all. Consequently, qualifying the theorists of history 
metaphysics of time as the metaphysics of historical time is necessary to disambiguate 
it from the analytical metaphysics of time.
First of all, reconceptualizing historical time shows not only a transient movement, 
but also a paradigmatic turn in the discipline. In fact, the theorists of history indicate 
that the former internal disciplinary division between realists and narrativists might 
have become out of date:
what strikes us as most interesting about this trend is the way that some 
of these theorists have sought to move beyond the emphasis on language 
and representation not by returning to a crude variant of objectivism 
or empiricism but by re-examining our relationship to the past and the 
past’s very nature and by attempting to construct a new metaphysics of 
[historical] time (KLEINBERG 2012, p. 1, emphasis added).
Secondly, the relationship among the dimensions of time raises the debate about 
presentism, both in the theory of history, and in the analytical metaphysics of time. 
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Therefore, an overview on this outstanding issue will allow this article to achieve its 
main objective, which is to show that the analytical metaphysics of time may contribute 
to the metaphysics of historical time of the theory of history, despite their different 
backgrounds.
The metaphysics of historical time is specifically concerned about the time 
dimensions. In effect, the past, present, and future relationship establishes the 
way the past hits the present and opens it up to the future. Although moral, 
political, aesthetic and material relations with the past are evident and common 
(PAUL 2015, p. 146), the historians and theorists of history are mostly interested 
in the epistemic relation with the past: “People have an epistemic relation with 
the past when they seek knowledge and/or understanding of historical reality” 
(PAUL 2015, p. 35). The criteria that distinguish the epistemic relation from other 
relations with the past are: “accuracy, comprehensiveness, consistency and originality” 
(PAUL 2015, p. 121-122). Most of all, the epistemic relationship among past, present, 
and future describes if the past entertains a plural relation with the present, since 
the experience of historical time produces different patterns of past, present, and 
future relationship (SIMON 2019, p. 74). The plural characteristic of the dimensions of 
historical time is probably the most prominent trait in the recent configuration of the 
concepts of historical time. Thus, the issue of a plural historical time arises and 
overshadows the model that prevailed either in the realistic or in the narrativist theory 
of history (TAMM; OLIVIER 2019, p. 14-16; FARELD 2018, p. 54; BURGES; ELIAS 
2016, p. 11) In general, the renewal of historical time regarding the relationship 
among past, present, and future can be observed in the different patterns of 
the plural characteristic of time that the new concepts of historical time deploy 
(CARDOSO JR. 2020).
In the recent theory of history, three main different patterns of the plural 
characteristic of time emerge.
Firstly, Zammito (2004) appeals to Koselleck’s multiple temporalities to conceive a 
realistic relationship among past, present, and future. The “actual evidence” of the past 
reveals the non-linear time that develops itself in between the “space of experience” 
and the “horizon of expectation”, as stated by Zammito: “The space of experience 
is the arrayed past for a given present, and the horizon of expectation is the cutting 
edge of future possibilities for any given present” (ZAMMITO 2004, p. 128-129). 
Likewise, according to Jordheim, Koselleck’s temporality assumes that the past is made 
of multiple layers whose endurance in the present discloses a “diachronic movement 
through the synchronic moment” (JORDHEIM 2012, p. 166). The multiple temporalities 
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that diachronicize the present moment unfreeze the layers of the past and put them at 
work within the present (JORDHEIM 2012, p. 153-154).1 
Secondly, Bevernage appeals to “spectral time” (BEVERNAGE 2008, p. 159) to 
observe that the past haunts and stirs the self-compliant linear history. Hence, the plural 
characteristic of historical time allows “a critique of the time concepts that force us […] 
to the formulation of an alternative chronosophy” (BEVERNAGE 2008, p. 155). Similarly, 
for Kasabova, a faithful understanding of what historians do lies in the immediate 
presence of the past in the present: “Far from being represented or reproduced in 
the present, the past manifests its presence in the here and now” (KASABOVA 2008, 
p. 333). Representing presence requires a “semantic transposition or relocation 
[between present and past experiences] by means of a part–whole relation establishing 
the [selective] link between what is retained and what is retrieved” (KASABOVA 2008, 
p. 341). 
Thirdly, in contrast with the previous metaphysicians of historical time, Bonneuil 
requires from the theory of mathematics a different regime for the plural characteristic 
of historical time that does not depend on the retractable distance between space of 
experience and horizon of expectation. The new image reshapes the past, present, 
and future relationship according to the point-to-set time arrangement (BONNEUIL 
2010, p. 34). The operation basically associates each present-point with a set of pasts 
(BONNEUIL 2010, p. 35), which saves historical time from the illusion of the “single past 
reported by one story”, provided that the present conceals a “multitude of pasts and 
futures in store at each moment” (BONNEUIL 2010, p. 46). Likewise, Roth thinks that 
the openness of multiple pasts implies that the descriptions of the historical experience 
are continuously rearranged by the descriptions of past experiences, which change with 
the passage of history (ROTH 2012, p. 317, 338-339). The plural, non-linear outlook 
of historical time requires “negotiations of a fit between descriptions and experience” 
(ROTH 2012, p. 313). Likewise, for Runia, as we will see in detail in the next section, the 
“different levels” (RUNIA 2006, p. 8) of past, which are simultaneous and discontinuous 
to the plan of present, make historical reality effectively experienced. Overall, Bonneuil, 
Roth and Runia argue for a regime of the plural characteristic of historical time called 
“polytemporality” according to important theorists of history (TAMM; OLIVIER 2019, 
p. 11; BURGES; ELIAS 2016, p. 13).
1  The Koselleckian multiple temporalities can be associated both with the concept multitemporality of 
Kairos and demotes the monotonous linearity of Chronos (RAMALHO 2020), and with the événement, 
according to Badiou and Zizek (BECK 2017). 
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In short, in the recent historical theory, at least three regimes of the plural 
characteristic of historical time coexist: The Koselleckian multiple temporalities, the 
regime of presence, and the non-Koselleckian polytemporality. All of them take part 
in the debate around presentism and anti-presentism in the recent theory of history. 
Presentism and anti-presentism primarily approach the plural characteristics of historical 
time, since each holds its own regime of the relationship among past, present, and 
future.
In the following section we will introduce two theses on analytical metaphysics of 
time that will provide us with resources to approach presentism and anti-presentism in 
the new metaphysics of historical time.
Theses of the metaphysics of time on presentism/eternalism and linear/
closed time
John McTaggart’s (1866-1925) article “The Unreality of Time” (MCTAGGART 1998), 
from 1908, founded the analytical metaphysics of time. It is the branch of the “philosophy 
of time that asks questions about the nature of temporal reality” (DENG 2018), and its 
development testifies “the importance of time in contemporary debates in metaphysics” 
(OAKLANDER 2014, p. xiv). The analytic metaphysicians of time are primarily interested 
in “the ‘objective’ time of physicists” (REYNOLDS 2012, p. 66), that is, natural or clock 
time, whereas historians and theorists of history focus on historical time.
McTaggart’s foundational thesis launched a prolific and longstanding debate that 
established, at least, seven main ideas about natural time, which are usually presented 
in pairs that put together a thesis and a counter-thesis concerning different properties 
of time: a) realism/antirealism, b) presentism/eternalism, c) linear/closed time, d) real/
unreal temporal change, e) endurantism/perdurantism, f) actualism/possibilism, and 
g) continuous/discrete time. Since the main objective of this article is to inspect some 
contours of the contemporary presentism and anti-presentism in the theory of history, 
we will discuss only two theses of the analytical metaphysics of time that, once brought 
together, allow us to draw significant analysis and results: presentism/eternalism, and 
linear/closed time. 
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1. presentism/eternalism
The analytical metaphysics of time presents a thesis about the relationship among 
past, present, and future that discusses the ontological status and plural relationship 
that the dimensions of time maintain. 
In general, three varieties of the plural temporality are recognized. They have in 
common the objective present; however, they contend about limiting or extending 
the ontological status of present since “there is an objective present: a unique time 
that reality itself picks out as special” (CAMERON 2016, p. 110). Firstly, if existence is 
assigned to the latest time that exists, past and present exist, but not future, since time 
grows as it passes and it does not include yet-to-come events or facts. This variety is 
called the “growing block theory” (DENG 2018). Secondly, if the analytic metaphysician 
of time ascribes the ontological privilege of being present to the fleeting now, past and 
future only acquire existence becoming present in the dimensionless coming-to-be or 
“moving Now” (DOLEV 2007, p. 7). This position is called the “moving spotlight theory” 
(DENG 2018). Thirdly, if the privilege is assigned to the present, it is the only time 
that it exists. This variety is known for its plural relationship among past, present, and 
future, and it is called presentism. The third variety will be the focus of this article. 
Presentists appeal to the evidence that it is only possible to assign existence to a 
past event or thing if the present is the referent: “Who can deny that there existed 
something identical with the Roman Empire which is no longer present?” (REA 2003, p. 
212-213). For the presentists, the past and the future do not hold the same status as 
the present, for only the present is real and is the measure for the other times to be 
experienced as time: “All that constitutes reality is how things are now. The past was 
part of reality, but it exists no more. The future will be part of reality, but it has not yet 
come into existence” (DUMMETT 2004, p. 73). Presentism establishes therefore that 
everything that exists, exists in the present time and what exists in the past and in the 
future can only be reported by analogy with the present (ZIMMERMAN 2008, p. 213; 
CRISP 2003, p. 211-212). For the presentists, someone exists in the present, but it is 
not possible to say that Plato and dinosaurs existed as a thing existing in the present, 
since what is here and now for someone is not the same that was for Plato and the 
dinosaurs in the past. In short, the reality of time depends on the immediacy of the 
present.
In turn, eternalism does not privilege any dimension of time. Hence, past, present, 
and future are on the same ontological footing: “Eternalism is typically stated as the 
view that past, present, and future things exist” (FIGG 2017, p. 1), (see also CRISP 
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2003, p. 218-219 and SIDER 2008, p. 243). The existence of things and events refer 
to propositions that hold their truth-values eternally: “a proposition has its truth-
value eternally if it is either always true or never true.” (CRISP 2003, p. 212) For the 
eternalists, someone exists as much as Plato and dinosaurs exist in the present, so the 
truth of these propositions are eternal. However, a unicorn does not exist, since the 
propositions about their existence are never true (CRISP 2003, p. 211). In contrast 
with the presentists, eternalists think that being present has a relative status: “what is 
present for us is not what is present for Caesar, since we are at a different time from 
Caesar, just as what is here for me is not what is here for you, since we are in different 
places” (CAMERON 2016, p. 110). The thesis on presentism contends the thesis on 
eternalism, so that the latter is an anti-presentism.
2. linear/closed time
The plural relationship between the dimensions of time may be conceived 
of according to two arrangements, the “linear time” and the “closed time” 
(LE POIDEVIN 1993, p. 158-159). The diagram that portrays the linear time is a 
straight infinite line, for linear time “is infinitely extended” between before and after 
according to an “asymmetric and irreflexive” (LE POIDEVIN 1993, p. 158) relationship. 
A temporal relationship of such type implies that a previous event causes the subsequent 
event. Consequently, if time is arranged in an infinite line, it has the definite, forward 
direction that the ordering of the events assigns it to have. They keep their past, 
present, and future individual characteristics as time passes. On the contrary, closed 
time is “finitely extended”, since the relationship among past, present, and future is 
symmetric and reflexive. Consequently, “in closed time, every instant is both before 
and after every other (including itself)” (LE POIDEVIN 1993, p. 158). Hence, it is not 
possible to assign to time a preferable order. The diagram that better portrays the 
relationship among past, present, and future, according to the closed time, is the circle 
without any assignable direction. 
The hypothesis of time-travel exemplifies the difference between the linear and the 
closed time concerning the direction of time. According to the linear-time thesis, if a 
time-traveler could change any past event, the ordering of time would change through 
and through, and the outcoming present would change accordingly. However, according 
to the closed-time thesis, if a time-traveler that goes back in time could change any 
past event, his/her action would be useless, since the order of time would reset itself 
and remain closed. Closed time is a curve that returns to the starting point, so that 
the outcoming present, even if the past is somewhat disturbed, does not bear any 
153
Hélio Rebello Cardoso Jr. 
Hist. Historiogr., Ouro Preto, v. 14, n. 35, p. 145-169, jan.-abr. 2021 - DOI https://doi.org/10.15848/hh.v14i35.1739
change. Even though the time-traveler could possibly change some circumstances in 
the previous events, the order of time does not go astray as to decentralize the steady 
self-returning circle of time. 
In general, linear time suits presentism because the asymmetric order of time 
assures that a change might occur over a past event for the order of time to be started 
and altered. It means that the present is the reference for the past to experience any 
significant change. In turn, closed time fits eternalism, since the symmetric order of time 
demotes the privilege of the past as the antecedent in the time chain. Consequently, 
the past could only be changed according to circumstances that do not disturb the 
overall outcoming present. In the long run, the closed-time/eternalist thesis prevailed 
over the linear-time/presentist one in the analytical metaphysics of time.
In the following section, some correspondences between the approaches of both 
the analytical metaphysics of time and the theory of history related to the past, present 
and future plural relationship are drawn.
Correspondences between historical time and the analytical 
metaphysics of time about presentism
The following correspondences will be made according to the theses of analytical 
metaphysics of time previously explained about the relationship among past, present, 
and future. The first correspondence will discuss some undertones of the presentism/
anti-presentism debate, which are common ground between the analytical metaphysics 
of time and the metaphysics of historical time in the recent theory of history: plural 
time in the analytical metaphysics and in the new historical metaphysics of time and 
synchronous/asynchronous historical time. Likewise, the second correspondence will 
discuss presentism and anti-presentism regarding the linear/closed time in the analytic 
tradition and being affected by historical time.
i. presentism/anti-presentism: multiple temporalities/pluritemporality, 
plural time in the analytical metaphysics, and synchronous/
asynchronous historical time 
Among historians, the antipode of presentism is not eternalism as the analytical 
metaphysics of time established, but anti-presentism, which alleges that “the 
term ‘presentism’ usually carries pejorative overtones” (WALSHAM 2017, p. 213). 
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In the long run, there are a classical and a recent presentism and anti-presentism among 
theorists of history and historians. For the classical presentists Croce, Collingwood, 
and Carr, the present is an essential condition that historical knowledge cannot deny 
(ARMITAGE 2020), since “we live in the present and are motivated by the conditions 
of our own lives” (ORESKES 2013, p. 596). The present casts projections upon the 
past and the future, provided that “they exist as the present’s own immanent modes” 
(TAMM; OLIVIER 2019, p. 2). The present provides access to the past, on the condition 
that suitable methodological procedures purge the historians’ work from the distorting 
effects of presentism over the past. For the classical anti-presentists, who “believe 
that the past must be approached on its own terms, and excessive reference to the 
present tends to impede this approach” (ORESKES 2013, p. 595), presentism distorts 
past, even if the most cautious methodological work were adopted. In general, for 
them, presentism was considered the source of an anachronical representation of 
historical time due to wrong methodological choices: “reference to the present, 
for most historians (at least nowadays), is viewed as how to do history wrong” 
(ORESKES 2013, p. 599). 
Even if famous historians sided presentism, anti-presentism remained as the major 
portrait of what historians do, beginning with the positivist foundations of historiography 
in the nineteenth century. However, the recent impact of feminist, post-colonial, which 
brought back the presentist perspective of ethical, social uses of history, and historical 
trauma studies (WALSHAM 2017, p. 2013-214). Therefore, these recent historiographical 
trends forced the historians and theorists to face again the challenge that presentism 
posed. Lately, the presentism/anti-presentism debate is not primarily related to the 
historians’ methodological choices as in its classical picture, insofar as it compromises 
with ontological issues related to the concept of historical time. 
In fact, the dispute about which position better suits the historians’ work 
nowadays has been displaced towards the debate around the plural characteristic 
of historical time. The new backdrop of theory of history indicates the latter as the 
common ground of historical time, in opposition to the “operation of distancing” or 
“historicization act” that important historians and theorists promoted in the past 
(FARELD 2016, p. 431 e 435). The plural characteristic of historical time is really 
significant among the emerging concepts of historical time and it implies different 
regimes of relationship among past, present, and future, as we will see. 
The recent displacement of the debate has made “the concept of presentism 
[…] slippery, amorphous and polyvalent” (WALSHAM 2017, p. 217). Thereof, 
presentism is “a fertile ground whose limits and features need to be explored” 
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(TAMM; OLIVIER 2019, p. 15). Above all, the recent presentism does not fall in 
the trap of the linear time, which allows “a vision of history that is predicated 
on the seductive idea of steady upward progress towards a better future” 
(WALSHAM 2017, p. 216). However, for the recent anti-presentists as well, history “is far 
from linear; the search for the ‘origins’ or the universality of […] any […] contemporary 
phenomena in a much earlier period may be deeply misleading rather than illuminating” 
(WELCH 2017, p. 251). In short, most of the presentists and anti-presentists are 
pluralists regarding the relationship among past, present, and future: “For an increasing 
number of authors, time has become non-linear, complex and constituted in part by 
the preservation of the past in the present” (TAMM; OLIVIER 2019, p. 11). They are, 
nevertheless, divided as to the different regimes of the plural characteristic of history 
of time that presentists and anti-presentists adopt. 
Similarly, the contemporary metaphysics of time developed by the analytic 
philosophy, as we saw, splits in two sides: presentists and eternalists. Eventually, 
the negotiation between presentist and anti-presentist analytic metaphysicians of 
time converges on different regimes regarding the plural relationship among past, 
present, and time, mostly like in the recent theory of history. In fact, the analytic 
metaphysicians of time observe that the plural characteristic of time involves the more 
basic experience of perceiving things physically in space and time. Are the dimensions 
of time simultaneously perceived? Or not? On the one side, from the presentist view of 
the plurality of time in the analytical metaphysics of time, all events are simultaneous 
to one another in the present, so that the experience follows from this “absolute 
simultaneity as to make what is physically real dependent on a single worldline” 
(SAUNDERS 2002, p. 281). On the other side, from the point of view of the eternalist, 
anti-presentist position, present cannot shrink to a simultaneous worldline to represent 
all that exists, because the plural characteristic of time does not have the present as 
reference. It is a sheaf of closed, self-returning curves, which no privileged observer 
located in the present can perceive at once (SAUNDERS 2002, p. 281). In short, the 
presentists affirm that the plurality of time tends to synchronization, whereas the 
anti-presentists believe that the plurality of time cannot be synchronized from an all-
encompassing, simultaneous present.
Thereof, the movement towards plural time that the analytical metaphysics of time 
developed sheds new light on the simultaneous/synchronous or the non-simultaneous/
asynchronous relationship between past, present, and future that the recent theory 
of history develops by its own means. In the theory of history, this issue is nowadays 
related to the question “as to how […] differential temporalities relate to each other” 
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(TAMM; OLIVIER 2019, p. 12) and allows “taking into account, within historians’ time, 
of ‘another time’” (LORAUX 2005, p. 128), according to different regimes of the plurality 
of historical time. 
Current presentism alleges that synchronization supports a positive way of 
approaching the plural characteristic of historical time, since it represents the way by 
which the past remains simultaneous to the present. In effect, the synchronization 
of multiple temporalities allows historiography to correct and prevent the harmful 
effects of presentism in the contemporary Weltanschauung as a régime d’historicité 
(HARTOG 2015, p. xvi). Hence, the presentist viewpoint does not overshadow the past, 
but guarantees the plurality of historical time: “present is definitively galvanized by 
multiple temporalities that collide dynamically and dialogically, effecting an experience 
of simultaneity” (BURGES; ELIAS 2016, p. 19). Consequently, presentism achieves a 
positive synchronization that adapts and adjusts “different times, different temporal 
regimes, to one another, to merge them into one to synchronize them”, thus meeting 
the Koselleckian regime of the plural characteristic of historical time, which is called 
“multiple temporalities” (JORDHEIM 2014, p. 513). 
To demote the harmful effects of presentism as a dominant world view, some 
theorists of history look back to Heidegger and/or to the ultimate Heideggerian lineage 
(Gumbrecht and Agamben, for instance) to preserve the regime of multiple temporalities. 
Consequently, the ambivalence between proper and improper temporality redeems 
presentism from the dark shadows that the inauthentic relationship among past, 
present, and future casts over history. By all means, the Heideggerian antidote turns 
out restoring the authenticity of the future and criticizes the ruling role that the present 
plays in the contemporary experience to restore the healthy synchronous experience of 
historical time (INCLÁN; VALERO 2017 and ARAÚJO; PEREIRA 2019, p. 8-9).
In turn, the current anti-presentism argues against the negative effects of the 
presentist synchronization over the plural characteristic of historical time (BURGES; 
ELIAS 2016, p. 11-13), so that it is a positive task “to step outside presentism into a 
fully immersive, thickly described historical experience” (WELCH 2017, p. 253). Thus, it 
is necessary to move ahead by radically assuming the nonsynchronous historical time, 
which launches a type of regime of the plural historical time, the “pluritemporality”, 
not coined by the Koselleckian “contemporaneity of the noncontemporaneous” 
(KOSELLECK 1985, p. 90). Symptomatically, Landwehr claims that the presentist attempt 
to synchronize the non-synchronicities of the plural characteristic of historical time ends 
up retrieving the harmful “diachronic dissonance”, which reshapes the triumphalist and 
Eurocentric history that the old presentism stood for (LANDWEHR 2012, p.19-20). 
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Moreover, as Hunt severely warns: “There is a certain irony in the presentism of our 
current historical understanding: it threatens to put us out of business as historians” 
(HUNT 2002) for, “at its worst, [presentism] encourages a kind of moral complacency 
and self-congratulation” (HUNT 2002) that invalidates the ontological status of the 
past. For instance, Turin launched the hypothesis that the global economy promotes 
an acceleration of time that tends to harmfully synchronize the healthy synchronous 
dynamics of everyday life, to the extent at which it assembles the “neoliberal regime of 
historicity” that stands for presentism nowadays (TURIN 2019a, p. 252-253). However, 
presentism, as Hartog defines, stems from a problematic heuristic statement that 
makes the regime of historicity transhistorical (TURIN 2019b, p. 30). Therefore, the 
archetypical schemes about the current historical experience are vacuous not only 
regarding an ontological commitment to history (TURIN 2016: 593-595), but also 
unspecified regarding the ordinary experience of history that everyday life undergoes 
(TURIN 2019a, p. 247-248; NICOLAZZI 2010, p. 251-254)2.
In short, presentist historical theorists admit the Koselleckian synchronous multiple 
temporalities in the sense that the presentist metaphysicians of time allege. Similarly, 
anti-presentist theorists of history assume the non-Koselleckian, asynchronous 
polytemporality regime of plural time that the eternalist metaphysicians of time support 
in the analytic tradition. Both presentists and anti-presentists nowadays are cautious 
about the harmful synchronization that presentism as a regime of historicity  might 
bring to the historical thinking and practice. Unlike Mudrovcic thinks, the historians of 
present may not fall in the trap of presentism, should they pay attention to the theorists 
of history (MUDROVCIC 2013: 11-12).
The first correspondence showed that the thesis of analytical metaphysics of time 
on presentism and eternalism provided a detailed definition of the regimes of the plural 
characteristic of time in the current debate between presentists and anti-presentists in 
the theory of history. The next correspondence between both will also show similarities 
that will disclose further inspection of the positions of presentist and anti-presentist 
theorists of history. Nevertheless, this time, the theoretical approach of the plural 
characteristic of time – the relationship among past, present, and future – will require 
us to develop the analytical metaphysics of time for the sake of the ethical issues 
that historical time poses regarding the renegotiation of the boundaries among past, 
present, and future.
2  Turin and Nicollazzi draw upon the previous criticism about Hartog’s regimes of his-
toricity regarding the problematic relation with the historiographical regimes, see 
(BLOCKER; HADDAD 2006 and HANNOUM 2008).
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ii. presentism/anti-presentism: linear/closed time in the analytic tradition 
and being affected by historical time
The shades of gray between presentists and anti-presentists among historical 
theorists nowadays can be further revealed if we lay hands on some of the 
resources that the analytical metaphysics of time has long been developing. Aiming 
at solving the tied positions between presentists and eternalists, the analytic 
metaphysicians of time turn to the idea that time can affect people in two ways 
(LE POIDEVIN 2003, p. 166-168). Being affected by time develops the linear/closed 
time theses concerning the plural characteristic of time. 
For presentists, as we saw, the present is the consequence of the forward causation 
that begins in the past. That is, x being a previous event and the cause of the subsequent 
event y confirms that the latter cannot be the cause of the former. Causation over 
time must conform to the antecedent-consequent order because the relationship 
among past, present, and future is asymmetric (LE POIDEVIN 2003, p. 165). At any 
rate, if the acknowledged statements about the past changes, the affection of the 
past over the present alters likewise, on the condition that the past starts a chain of 
causal-related events provided that “statements about the past are true only 
in virtue of facts about present evidence” (LE POIDEVIN 2003, p. 172). Only 
the remains of the past in the present can change the recognized truth about the 
past, the latter stands still if not disturbed. In this sense, the plural characteristic 
of time assumes a linear arrangement. The past is present in the present 
insofar as it respects the forward causation and fits the asymmetric arrangement 
of the linear time, as observed. 
For the presentist historians, affecting the past requires, not only a change 
regarding the recognized statements about the past, but also the “renegotiation of the 
boundaries between present and past” (FARELD 2016, p. 432) that, in consequence, 
shall displace the recognized statements about it. The past asks for revision and/or 
reparation. The present clings to the past since the latter harasses the former to create 
the expectation of some change in the present by the reparation of the past that 
does not go by. The past is not materially present in the present, it is the specter of a 
traumatic or repressed past that forces the present to look back in shame or fear. It 
forces the present to claim for justice to fix the past, redeem the victims and heal the 
present. The redemptive strength of the past launches a forward causal chain towards 
the present. The affection of time begins in the past with the reparation of the wounds 
and propagates asymmetrically onward with the consequent discharge and relief of the 
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burdened present. In fact, the present judges, but the past remains the same, even if 
appeased with its reparation from the point of view of the present. The difference that 
the presentification of the past brings is that, after the redeeming affection of the past, 
it can be effectively past and settles down, allowing the paid-off present to open up 
to the future. In these terms, presentist historians and presentist theorists of history 
believe that there is a forward causation that makes effective the affection of the past 
that purges the haunted present.
In contrast, for the anti-presentist analytic metaphysician of time 
(LE POIDEVIN 2003, p. 169), past, present, and future are equally real, since any 
past fact maintains its ontological status regardless of any present event or statement 
about the past. Being on the same ontological footing, past, present, and future 
are symmetric to each other, that is, x being cause of y is compatible with y being 
cause of x. According to the closed time thesis, “every instant is both before and 
after every other (including itself)” (LE POIDEVIN 1993, p. 158). Deprived of 
onward transmission, time stands still. Nevertheless, its immobility does not mean that 
it is irreversible and that the past cannot affect the present. For the anti-presentist, 
it is possible to conceive that the past affects the present regardless of the forwards 
causation hypothesis.
In effect, the analytic metaphysicians of time call the anti-presentist hypothesis 
about the order of time the “backwards causation” (LE POIDEVIN 2003, p. 180). For 
instance, a time-traveler writes the words “see you later” in a piece of paper when 
leaving his/her present in the twenty-first century, and travels back in time with the 
written paper. In the present when the paper was written, “see you later” led to serious 
consequences, which the time traveler would like to block. When landing in the past, the 
written sheet of paper becomes a past event, but its cause – being written – remains in 
the present, so the onward chain that guarantees the precedence of the cause over the 
effect is reversed. Due to the symmetric characteristic of closed time – “every instant 
is both before and after every other (including itself)” (LE POIDEVIN 1993, p. 158) – 
the cause of the past event y lies in the future event x, which is a present event in the 
twenty-first century. In short, the cause is ahead of its effect and the time traveler can 
read in the past a written sheet of paper that has not yet been written.
The phenomenon of backward causation is only possible according to characteristics 
of the closed time and cannot change the outcoming present, since there is no forward 
causal chain to put the affective action across to decisively hit the present. On the 
contrary, being the time travel performed along the linear time, if the time traveler rips 
up the written paper when he/she arrives in the past, it would have altered the chain 
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of time, so that the written sheet would vanish away as to cancel its compromising 
consequences in the present.
How about historians and theorists of history? Should they raise the time 
travel hypothesis to propose such a counterintuitive notion as the backward 
causation in closed time? To answer these questions, the next paragraphs will 
show that the fracture of the so-called “presence-paradigm” (BEVERNAGE 2008, 
p. 149) illustrates the difference between the presentists and the anti-presentists 
in relation to the forward and the backward causation in history, provided that the 
relationship among past, present, and future shows different regimes among the 
“theorists of ‘Presence’” (KLEINBERG 2012, p. 3). Furthermore, since historical time 
involves the renegotiation of the boundaries among past, present, and future, the 
presentist/anti-presentist debate about the causation of time and the being affect 
by the past in the current theory of history discloses some issues that the analytical 
metaphysics did not deal with. 
Bevernage’s presence-paradigm version, according to the plural characteristic of 
time, as we saw, assumes that it is not possible for the past to be present in the present 
in an unrepresented and material way. For Bevernage, the spectral past in the present 
forces language to represent the plural relationship among past, present, and future 
according to the “idea of non-contemporaneity, anachronism, or local persistence of the 
past” (BEVERNAGE 2008, p. 157) in “the absolutely [synchronous] self-contemporaneous 
present” (BEVERNAGE 2008, p. 156). Bevernage contends that the idea that the past 
is present as a real thing led Runia’s presence-paradigm, provided that it adheres to a 
realist regime of pluritemporality, to commit to the prejudice according to which “the 
‘presence’ of the past is treated as the full [not spectral] presence that is the antonym 
of absence” (BEVERNAGE 2008, p. 165). Without the spectral past that remains in the 
present, it is impossible to start the forward causal chain that, affecting historical time, 
puts through the call for reparation and healing “to start from the ground up to create 
a new present or new time” (BEVERNAGE 2008, p. 166). 
Likewise, Kasabova’s presence-paradigm argues that Runia’s antirepresentationalism, 
according to which “the past is present here and now” (KASABOVA 2008, p. 332), 
recalls the misleading old faith in the historical realism. According to Kasabova, the 
historical approach to the past obeys to an ordinary, forward causation that observes 
the asymmetric structure of time. Accordingly, the temporal order of historical time 
grounds the semantic dependence between temporal clauses, for “the former explains 
the latter ‘earlier’ grounds; ‘later’ is grounded in ‘earlier’ because ‘earlier’ explains 
‘later’” (KASABOVA 2008, p. 350). 
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In short, Bevernage’s and Kasabova’s presence-paradigm relies on the forward 
causation and, therefore, is of the presentist kind. On the contrary, Runia does not 
appeal to the sequential, asymmetric order of time provided that the backward 
causation disregards the idea of antecedent and consequent. Therefore, being x cause 
of y, and vice-versa, it sets a symmetric relation that rules the Runian presence. 
Consequently, the Runian anti-presentism disturbs the linear semantic dependence 
that the grammar assigns to the tensed representation of time, so that “Runia’s stripe 
[‘a strong brand of realism’] would reject the claim that the past is a retroactive 
reconstruction, just as they would reject the claim that the past is represented in the 
present” (KASABOVA 2008, p. 335). For Runia’s version of the presence-paradigm, 
indeed, the past is materially, and in an unrepresented way, present in the present 
(RUNIA 2006, p. 1). The historical causation or affection works symmetrically 
“upward to the present, and downward from the present.” (RUNIA 2006, p. 20). 
As observed, the simultaneity in the order of time requires a symmetric arrangement 
according to the analytical metaphysics of time. 
The disruptive realistic presence of the past – its “out-of-place-ness” (RUNIA 2006, 
p. 19) –“occurs when we are ‘overtaken by history’ and start—regressively—to do things 
that are at odds with our identity” (RUNIA 2006, p. 6). Unprecedented levels of the 
past, which are simultaneous and discontinuous to the plan of present, rush “upward to 
the present” and overthrow the expectations of the present (RUNIA 2006, p. 8). Past 
will only act and start a causal chain if the present starts first as the causal antecedent 
of the past. Time must rush “downward from the present”. Unlike the presentist forward 
causation, the present does not heal or repair an immaterial, spectral past to launch 
the causal chain from the past towards the present, since it acts over a material past. 
The causal backward affection of present shall release, not the haunted present, but the 
past itself. In short, a present event shall cause the past to engender new events from 
the old ones (RUNIA 2006, p. 14). How does it work, then?
Since the backward causation obeys the inalterable circle of closed time, it cannot 
change the outcoming present. For instance, the time traveler, traveling back according 
to the closed time, cuts into pieces the compromising paper written in the future when 
arriving in the past. However, the outcoming present, even if the paper were torn up in 
the past, would find a way to be accomplished anyhow. In short, causation cannot heal 
the present or purge the past. Despite this disadvantage, the closed-time hypothesis 
grants to historical time the loose symmetric structure that does not observe a preferable 
order for time. The present affects the past backwards and urges a new time so that the 
present “is transformed into something that could not have been [neither] imagined” 
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(RUNIA 2006, p. 14). It is not the discharged present from the weight of the past that 
can at last move on, but a future moved by a brand-new past. 
Consequently, the negotiation of the boundaries among past, present, and future 
does not work as its presentist version. The symmetry of closed time applies not only 
to the past that lies in the past, but also to the present that shall pass to make room 
for the future. In fact, the future removes the present by skipping over the outcoming 
present after the latter has symmetrically acted backwards upon the old past to extract 
new events from it. Since the closed time describes a circle, every instant of any 
outcoming present is in the neighborhood of the closure of the circle of time. In this 
sense, each past event is immediately in the here and now and thus can be counter-
actualized whenever the present event skips over it backwards (CARDOSO JR. 2005).
In short, Runia’s presence paradigm is of the anti-presentist kind. According to the 
analytical metaphysics of time, the present event causes the past event backwards in 
favor of an unprecedented time, not for the sake of the past itself: “if there were a large 
number of instances of events caused by later, rather than earlier, events, would the 
world not be rather more surprising than it is?” (LE POIDEVIN 2003, p. 183). 
Final remarks
We began by portraying two theses of the analytical metaphysics of time: presentism/
eternalism and linear/closed time. The confrontation between both theses shed new light 
on the current debate concerning presentism and anti-presentism in the recent theory 
of history. In this debate, we focused on those dichotomies to reveal some unnoticed 
contours of recent concepts of historical time (metaphysics of historical time). 
From this initial approach of two theses, we believe that further correspondences 
between the theses of analytical metaphysics of time and the characteristics of the 
emerging concepts of historical time seem to be worth of future research, although 
they were all not deeply analyzed in this article. The other recognized five theses of the 
analytical metaphysics of time are realism/antirealism, real/unreal temporal change, 
endurantism/perdurantism, actualism/possibilism, and continuous/discrete time, all of 
which raise good expectations regarding future studies on the subject.
This article also shows that an account of the general relationship between the 
analytical metaphysics of time and the new metaphysics of historical time is required. 
The cooperation of both seems to take a step forward regarding the overcoming of “a 
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certain kind of chronopathology – that is theoretical myopia about time” (REYNOLDS 
2012, p. 77), which can infect both sides. On the side of the analytical metaphysics 
of time, the urge to retain the objective time of science or to emulate the natural 
and commonsensical attitude towards time tends to tie the metaphysics of time to a 
seemingly cautious ambition related to ordinary language and the epistemic patterns 
to which it is associated to avoid the risk of speculation due to either derisory nostalgia 
or utopic reverie.
Since the metaphysics of time ultimately depends on the McTaggartian hypothesis, 
the theory of history offers a range of concepts that challenges the idea that time is an 
experience mostly related to “a given order of events” (MCCUMBER 2012, p. 20) that 
people accept as their present situation. The ordering of historical time has different 
textures: “Sometimes the ordering is more independent of me, so that past events 
shape themselves into the production of a present reality with which one must cope. 
Other times I have more leeway to see the past as obliging me to cope with its results.” 
(MCCUMBER 2012, p. 20) Either way, past is flexible and unstable because history is 
something to be dealt with, even if one must bear it as an unavoidable outcome.
On the side of the metaphysics of historical time, this article showed, with the 
aid of the analytical metaphysics of time, that there are both presentist and anti-
presentist theorists of history who have not been swept away by presentism as the 
current overarching regime of historicity. 
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